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THESIS

AN ASSESSMENT OF
KOREAN MILITARY COMPENSATION POLICIES
PROJECTED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

Gun Pyo, Hong

December 1986

Thesis Advisor

Kenneth J. Coffey

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T230684

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited	
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) 54	7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, California 93943-5000	
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, California 93943-5000		9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8a NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO
		TASK NO	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO
11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) AN ASSESSMENT OF KOREAN MILITARY COMPENSATION POLICIES PROJECTED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.			
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) HONG, Gun Pyo			
13a TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis	13b TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1986 December	15 PAGE COUNT 79
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17 COSATI CODES		18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
		Institution Approach, Market Approach, General Allowances, Special Duty Allowances.	
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
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20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL KENNETH J. COFFEY		22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 408-646-3302	22c OFFICE SYMBOL 54Cu

19. Abstract (cont)

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An Assessment of
Korean Military Compensation Policies
projected for the 21st Century

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1986



ABSTRACT

The Korean military organization has been organized and largely sustained by the loyalty and patriotism of its members. However, improvements in the economy may create future military manpower problems.

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To address this issue, this research examines the current compensation policies in the context of military-civilian comparisons and obtains the views of Korean officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School. The results of these efforts provide the basis for identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for the Korean military to meet the personnel retention problems of the 21st Century.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am truly grateful to the Korean Air Force for giving me the opportunity to study at the Naval Postgraduate School.

I am very grateful to numerous people for assisting in the completion of this thesis. Most of all, I would like to express my appreciation to my thesis advisor, professor Kenneth J. Coffey, for his enthusiastic guidance and support. Without many hours of his coaching and encouragement, this thesis could not have been completed.

I am also appreciative of the helpful comments concerning this thesis given by my second reader, professor Stephen L. Mehay.

I also am very grateful to Alvin, Rick and Graham for their English help, and Han Gi Seul, Jo In Gu for the gathering of data. My special thanks is extended to LT. Jacquelyn Arrowood, USN, for her aid in helping me understand U.S. military manpower problems.

Finally, I extend my sincere thanks to my mother, family, Kyung Ae, and Young Deuk for their understanding and encouragement.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

Today, as aircraft become more modern and powerful, the significance of air combat readiness for national defense is more critical than ever before. The latest wars have shown its critical significance. The results effect every country trying to increase its air combat readiness level through improvements in human resources and weapons systems.

However, because of economic, technological and human resource constraints, it may not be possible for every country to acquire the desired improvements. Accordingly, a country must find the most efficient and effective way to increase total air combat readiness under such constraints.

The degree to which a country can improve its human resources and weapons systems in large measure depends on economic growth. In Korea, for example, economic growth has been largely stimulated by export demand. Without natural resources, Korea has been going through a major transformation from dependence upon labor-intensive industries to concentration on capital-intensive industries, including the steel industry and ship-building.

The benefits from this growth have spread throughout Korean society, and family income in both urban and rural areas has benefited equally. In addition, there has been the development of a middle class and an expansion of high school education opportunities. These increased educational opportunities, in particular, have served to increase social equality and economic advancement. [Ref. 1: p. 5]

Nevertheless, in terms of overall military capability, South Korea currently is inferior to North Korea. (See Table 1).

In the future, however, the goal is to achieve military parity based on strong economic growth, and to accomplish this, it is clear that Korea must consider an increased defense effort. While the allocation of resources to the military will mean a reduction in funds for non-military programs, the one factor that dominates Korean society is the threat of aggression by North Korea. Therefore, Korea has been willing to accept heavy defense expenditures, which are now about 6 percent of GNP.

TABLE 1
MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT CONTRASTS BETWEEN SOUTH
AND NORTH KOREA

	South	North
<i>MANPOWER</i>		
Total armed forces	622,000	785,000
- Army	540,000	700,000
- Navy	49,000	34,000
- Air Force	33,000	51,000
Para-Military forces	5,780,000	5,170,000
<i>EQUIPMENT</i>		
Army		
- Artillery	2,800	5,300
- Tank	1,200	3,200
- Armored Vehicle	800	1,200
Navy		
- Submarine	0	21
- Destroyer	20	2
- Total naval vessel	101	537
Air Force		
- Bomber and Fighter	450	740
- Transport	61	369
- Total A/C	618	1322

* Source: Adapted from "South and North Korea in Graphic Representation" pp. 59-60, National Unification Board, Republic of Korea.

Today, the Korean military force is critical to the deterrence of North Korean aggression, and it plays a major role in the country's stability. Because all young citizens are subject to performing the sacred duty¹ of national defense, the military is providing a major pool of technology-oriented and trained workers for industry.

In the Air Force, for example, technology applied to weaponry and tactics has required more high-quality pilots, engineers and computer programmers than ever before, and many of these citizens have subsequently applied their skills in civilian jobs. It is clear, therefore, that parallel growth in the economy and the defense establishment are mutually supportive, and essential to Korean success in the internationally competitive society to be faced in the future. In terms of achieving such growth,

¹The Constitution of the Republic of Korea Article 34 "All citizens should have the duty to defend the national territory in accordance with the provisions of law"

Sneider² has suggested three possible scenarios for the future military posture of Korea: [Ref. 1: pp. 44-45].

First scenario is a continuation of the present policy with the defense budget representing approximately 6 percent of GNP.

Second scenario would involve a higher defense budget than 6 percent of GNP and increased manpower ceilings, but with only limited utilization of higher technology and weapons systems.

The third scenario would involve a pronounced shift to high technology weapons systems, accompanied by lower manpower ceilings, in the range of a 25-40 percent force reduction.

In the view of Sneider and key Korean government leaders, and as illustrated in Figure 1.2, the third scenario appears to be the most suitable to the future military structure of Korea. This judgement will prove to be correct, however, only if the following conditions can be met:

- (1) The increased military budget will be absorbed within a balanced budget, given the expected annual real growth of 7-9 percent.
- (2) Sufficient funds for capital investment and stimulation of economic development will still be available.
- (3) A reduction in manpower of 30-40 percent will bring a reduction in operation and maintenance costs greater than the increased cost of high technology weapons systems.

In addition, as the economic gap between South and North Korea grows larger, as shown in Figure 1.1, North Korea might decide to reconsider its present belligerent policies and accept a real reduction of tensions. South Korea would thereby have less need to increase its military effort.

In the meantime, however, Sneider worries that North Korea might consider an attack against South Korea before the economic gap³ grows larger and their current military advantage is lost.

Accordingly, as Korea President Chun has emphasized "the next 2-3 years are the most **important** period". If Korea can endure the next 2-3 years, then it can become **an advanced** industrial nation without a significant threat of North Korean aggression.

²Richard L. Sneider served as U.S. Ambassador to Korea in 1974-1978.

³See Figure 1.1.





Figure 1.1 GNP in South and North Korea.

As Figure 1.2 illustrates, point A represents the current level of military expenditures. To increase armed readiness of war from R_1 to R_2 , budget allocation should shift from point A to point B, a move which represents new weapons systems accompanied by lower manpower ceilings, the policy option which represents an optimal allocation of resources for deterring North Korean aggression.

Within the context of economic growth and both technological improvements and manpower reduction in the armed forces, one of the major concerns will be the military's capacity to maintain adequate levels of manpower, of sufficient quality, and at a reasonable cost, to perform its role effectively. This question is particularly important because of recent changes in the educational system and the civilian labor force.

To help policy makers address this concern, this research will examine current military compensation policies with a view toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for the Korean military by the year 2000. In particular, this research will investigate the pecuniary compensation policies for officers.


However, as retention rates are classified, this research has been limited to examination of available information on Korean Air Force policies. In addition, Korean officers at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have been surveyed for their opinions on military compensation policies. This research expects to provide a good foundation for improved human resource management in the quest for maximum air combat effectiveness. Hopefully, the study results will provide both guidance and useful recommendations for better manpower management.

B. CHARACTER OF MILITARY SERVICE

Understanding the character of military service in Korea is helpful when developing an improved compensation program.

Whereas economic growth, industrial expansion and increases in income and living standards have taken place, the nature of Korean military service as an institution has not changed.

An institution is a well-established and structured pattern of behavior of relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of the culture. Its purpose transcends individual self-interest in favor of a higher good. Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling. Similarly, military leaders point out, individuals joining a military service take an oath of office to the nation and accept a "way of life" rather than simply accepting a job. To encourage commitment, the military places a high value on the welfare of its members. [Ref. 2: p. 7]



Note : Define Terms in Graph.

M_0 = 60,000 troops

M_n = Reduced end strength

W_0 = Current technology weapon capability

W_n = Increased technology weapon capability

R_1 = Current Readiness level & illustrates a less than optimal resource allocation

R_2 = Improved Readiness level & illustrates optimal resource allocation

Max Readiness = $f(\text{Manpower Requirement, Weapon Capability})$
subject to Constraint of 6 percent of GNP

Figure 1.2 Maximization of Readiness for Given Military Budget.

Military service in Korea has many institutional aspects. The basic purpose of the military forces is to defend the national territory and to engage in combat when called upon. Military personnel cannot unilaterally decide their retirement at any time they choose. They are willing to give up their lives if necessary for their country and they often work more than civilians without overtime pay. They must obey orders without question. Their actions are regulated by the military law under which they can be prosecuted for crimes unique to the military, such as disobedience and absence without permission [Ref. 2: p. 7].

Traditionally, conditions of military service such as wartime risks, frequent moves, family separations, field, sea or flying duty, and extended duty hours best explains the character of military service.

C. COMPENSATION SYSTEM

Military compensation policies are complex and have received increasing attention in recent years, when economic growth has been stable and society has become more economically competitive.

Compensation can be defined as all forms of financial returns and tangible services and benefits received as part of an employment relationship. An individual's perception of the compensation package greatly impacts on the job choice decision. How much compensation is adequate to attract and retain qualified personnel is a vital issue for both the military and civilian sectors. To compete with pay increases in the private sector, the military must continuously examine existing compensation policies.

As employees, they may consider their own compensation as a return on their investment in education and training. For most of them, the pay they receive for the work they perform is the major source of personal wealth; hence, it is an important determinant of their economic and social well-being. [Ref. 3: pp. 500-501]

Korean military compensation consists of pay, allowances and many supplemental benefits. All military personnel receive basic pay, which is the same for individuals working in the same specialty in the same pay grade and with the same time in service. Quarters and semiannual allowances are paid to all military personnel in the same pay grade and same time in service. However, allowances can vary depending on such factors as pay-grade, occupational specialty-rate, marital status, time in service, number of dependents, duty assignment, and intentions of making a career in the military. Necessities such as housing, food, uniforms and medical care are

provided either directly or in the form of allowances or coupons. And a large portion of military compensation is deferred; that is, retirement benefits are accrued and paid to persons leaving military service, depending upon their years of service.

The Korean government has a plan to increase public employee pay by 7 percent in the year 1987. Because public employees (including military) are paid only about 65 percent of civilian pay, 60 percent of all public employee are receiving pay that is less than the standard urban cost of living. [Ref. 4]

In the area of increasing wages for the public employee work force, several key questions need to be addressed. For example, what standard should be used to measure pay adjustments? Also, should specific principles be adopted? For example, principles could direct policy makers to:

- provide an acceptable standard of living.
- allow for management flexibility.
- have a predictable adjustment mechanism.
- distinguish between levels of responsibility.
- be acceptable to military personnel.
- support and preserve the hierarchical military structure.
- be equitable.
- minimize pay differentials among people of equal rank and service time.
- be fully visible to service members and the public.
- recognize differing working conditions.
- reward superior performance. [Ref. 2: p. 25]

D. APPROACH TO MILITARY COMPENSATION

The **purpose** of the military compensation system is to attract, retain and motivate the number and quality of personnel needed to maintain the desired level of national security.

Military compensation can be premised primarily on institutional considerations; that is, it is governed greatly by traditional military oriented social and cultural values.

It also can be premised more on market considerations and less on traditional military oriented values. [Ref. 2: p. 6]

Therefore, two competing schools of thought were apparent in the research literature on how military compensation levels should be determined and structured: the institutional and the market approaches [Ref. 2: p. 13].

1. Institutional Approach

The Institutional Approach views the military compensation system as a key tool for enhancing the relationship between the military and its personnel. Individuals of the same grade and seniority are viewed as equally important to the military mission regardless of the occupational specialty to which they are assigned. All military jobs are considered equally important.

To develop desired cohesiveness, unity of purpose, and reciprocal loyalty, job differences are subordinated to this common expectation. Although some differential pays are accepted in practice as necessary to staff the force, this approach believes that such differences should be minimized. [Ref. 2: p. 14]

2. Market Approach

Those who favor the Market Approach believe the institutional approach is inefficient, and compensation policies to affect accessions and retention should be evaluated in terms of supply and demand; that is, personal and compensation policies should be viewed as mechanisms for obtaining the desired force structure at least cost.

The market approach thinks an individual is more likely to base decisions to join or remain in a military service on the level of military compensation relative to that available in alternative civilian employment. To minimize total personnel costs, they contend that competitive pay levels should be set and adjusted by occupation based on supply and demand conditions in the job market. [Ref. 2: p. 15]

Currently, in Korea, military compensation policies have been largely influenced by the institutional view. But, over the years, policy changes have increasingly reflected the influence of the market approach.

As noted earlier, Korea's future military posture and economic growth will focus defense efforts on high technology weapon systems accompanied by lower manpower ceilings. To attract the higher quality persons needed by the military to achieve these goals, it is likely that further changes in compensation policies will be necessary. Yet, it is unlikely that the pure market approach will be adopted. Vestiges of the institutional approach are likely to be present for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, economic necessity dictates that market supply and demand factors will be the driving force in future compensation policy changes.

E. IMPACT OF MARKET APPROACH

The likely emphasis in future compensation decisions of the market approach will reflect a clear relationship with known economic laws, in particular, the law of supply, which states that the quantity supplied of a product usually varies directly with its price, assuming that all other things remain the same. In other words, if the military is willing to pay for higher quality recruits, more high quality recruits will select military careers over civilian careers.

The Korean young generation must perform a period of national defense duty in either an officer or non-officer status. If they want to serve as an officer, they can enter officer procurement programs such as the academy or university (including ROTC). Academy graduates have an option to serve for 10 years, while University graduates only serve for 3 years (ROTC for 2 years). After completing their duty, if they decide to remain in the military, we call them career military personnel.


As mentioned in the previous section, today's young generation tends to select occupations which can guarantee the most income. In addition to the influence of income, factors affecting such decisions are young generation tastes, prospects for economic growth and middle class opportunities. At present, these all have combined to decrease the supply of high quality personnel to the military.

As shown in Figure 1.3, if current military compensation remains the same, which is characterized by a 40 percent differential between military and civilian pay, the supply curve of high quality people wishing to remain in the military will be shifting downward. If, however, as illustrated in Figure 1.4, the Korean military is able to combine this supply curve decrease with a reduction in the manpower ceiling and more technical weapons systems, we prompt movement from Q_0 to Q_1 .

Although the current compensation gap between military and civilian personnel is not changing, there will be an increasing shortage of career officers, as shown as a gap between Q_1Q_3 on the supply curve S_1 . To overcome this projected shortage, we must increase military compensation to C_1 in order to recruit and retain high quality people for military careers.

In conclusion, the problem of future shortages in high quality officers can be overcome through changes in compensation levels. To this end, we will explore what specific policy changes may be necessary.

Military
Compensation



Note : Define terms in Graph.

Q_0 = Demand Curve of High Quality people

S_0 = Old Supply Curve of High Quality people

S_1 = New Supply Curve of High Quality people in a future


C_A = Current level at present compensation rates

C_B = Compensation level necessary to maintain present levels of high quality people after decrease in Supply

Figure 1.3 High Quality People Enlistment as a Function of Compensation.

Military

Compensation



Note : Define terms in Graph.

Q_0 = present Manning level

Q_1 = Number desired under scenario 3

Q_3 = Number available manning level at present compensation rates

C_0 = Current compensation level

C_1 = Compensation level necessary to achieve Q_1

Figure 1.4 Demand and Supply Curve of Officer.

II. MILITARY TO CIVILIAN PAY COMPARISON

This chapter compares military pay to civilian pay. Whereas no data exists which would allow an exact comparison of military and private sector compensation for personnel with the same levels of work experience, the level of accuracy supports general conclusions.

A. THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPARISON

1. Views of Compensation Differ

The military and the private sector differ in the way they view compensation. Although movement to the Market Approach is occurring, the military currently emphasizes an "Institutional Approach" viewing individuals of the same grade and seniority as equally important to the military defense mission, regardless of the occupational specialty to which they are assigned. Accordingly, military compensation is based primarily on grade and years of service. Occupational differences are taken into account through special duty allowances for those occupations in which risk and specialty problems exist.

In contrast, civilian compensation is more likely to be based on the "Market Approach" where labor supply and demand for a particular occupation are more important determinants of the amount of compensation that a particular occupation will receive at any given time [Ref. 5: p. 2].

2. Cost of Living Variation

The cost of living, and therefore real salary levels, are significantly affected by geographical location, population, tax policies, and the availability of health insurance and social welfare benefits.

The concepts of nominal income and real income also must be distinguished. For example, a person living in Seoul and another person living in Daejeon may have identical nominal income, yet the cost of living in Daejeon is lower than in Seoul. Thus, those in Daejeon have a much higher real income.

The same concept can be applied to military and civilian comparisons. A military person may receive the equivalent of X dollars annually, but the civilian, his counterpart, really earns less in terms of real income, because military fringe benefits are considerably more generous than civilian benefits (Military fringe benefits exceed civilian benefits largely because of the greater value of military retirement).

3. Differences in Mission and Productivity

No civilian firms have missions comparable to the military. Further, military life has the "X-Factor" which refers to the hardships and unusual demands of military service which are not normally found in civilian employment.

During peacetime, the military protects the territory and maintains the force of deterrence toward North Korean aggression, while the mission and productivity in the civilian sector are directly related to and primarily concerned with profits. Civilians can easily transfer to another occupation, whereas the military cannot.

B. COMPARISON

1. Assumption and Limitation

The following assumptions and limitations are made in studying pay comparability. Military compensation data was obtained from a 1986 standard pay table prepared by the Korean Air Force Headquarters.

Civilian data was obtained from the 1985 Year Book, published by the Department of Labor. Some data has been modified. For example, it is assumed that the 1986 increasing rate of income will be 5.5 percent, and that University Graduate monthly income will be 596,917⁴ Won. It is also assumed that civilian workers have never experienced periods of unemployment.

Pay grade and corresponding ranks are shown in Table 2. [Refs. 6,7] All subsequent discussion of pay grades and ranks are based on Table 2.

Military pay does not include income tax deductions or any other kinds of income deduction. It is assumed that all officers will be commissioned at age 24.⁵ Only cash compensation of military and civilian personnel of the same levels of age and experience will be compared.

In comparing Korean entitlements, corresponding U.S. military entitlements will be matched as closely as possible. The occupations of clerk (CLK), engineer and jet pilot will be analyzed. Family subsidies will be calculated based on two children. Housing allowances will not be calculated.

⁴1984 Univ. Graduate Male Avg income 534,411 Won. 1985 Univ. Graduate Male Avg income 564,800 Won (5.6% increase).

⁵Since Korean educational system 6-3-3-4 they enter primary school at age 7.

TABLE 2
PAY GRADE AND RANK

Pay Grade	Rank(Air Force)
O-1	So-Wi (Second Lieutenant)
O-2	Jung-Wi (First Lieutenant)
O-3	Dai-Wi (Captain)
O-4	So-Ryung (Major)
O-5	Jung-Ryung (Lieutenant Colonel)
O-6	Dae-Ryung (Colonel)

2. Data

To obtain an average wage level for each month of service, earnings were defined to include basic pay,⁶ general allowances and special allowances. Some military officers receive additional⁷ allowances. The list of allowances is found in Table 3.

For civilians, average incomes are different depending on occupation, as shown in Figure 2.1. [Refs. 9,10] The highest paying civilian industry is industry 7 (Financing, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Service) which is well above the 1985 All industry average monthly income.

3. Comparison

The purpose of this subsection is to compare military salaries with civilian salaries for three specific occupations: clerks, engineers and jet pilots. The analysis is independent of other factors such as desire for military service, perceived opportunities in and out of the military and personal considerations which may influence job choice. This analysis is for the purpose of example only and should not be considered absolute.

⁶See Appendix A

⁷See Appendix B for detailed allowances.

TABLE 3
LIST OF ALLOWANCES PAY

<u>General Allowances</u>	<u>Special Duty Allowances</u>
Quarters Allowance	Technical Allowance
Semiannual Allowance	Flight Duty Allowance
Family Subsidy	Allowance for Hazardous
Continuation Allowance	Allowance for Legal, Religion, Medical
Activity Allowance	Allowance for Instructor
	Incentive Allowance for Specialty

*Source: Adapted from Korean Air Force Field Manual 35-1
"Personnel Management" pp. 40-41.

Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 show the clerk, engineer and jet pilots, monthly pay profile based on the 1986 pay scale. The income is the monthly amount of compensation a military officer would receive at a given year of service, assuming due course promotion.

As shown in Figure 2.2, military CLK monthly income surpasses 1986 University Graduate average income(86 UG AVG INCOME) after 9 years of commissioned service. (Civilian CLK monthly income surpasses 86 UG AVG INCOME within 6-7 years from graduation) [Ref. 8: p. 538]. In Figure 2.3, we see that military Engineer monthly income surpasses 86 UG AVG INCOME after 8 years of commissioned service.

As Figure 2.4 illustrates, military Pilot monthly income surpasses 86 UG AVG INCOME after 3 years from commission.

As shown in Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, officers are compensated quite well, but their incomes lag behind that of 1986 average income for those with Bachelor' degrees for the first 8-9 years (except jet pilot).

Figure 2.5 compares clerk's income in the civilian and the military sector. The income of clerks by age-groups is depicted; military income is developed in the same manner as in Figure 2.2 and 1986 civilian income is estimated from the calendar year




Figure 2.1 85 Average Monthly Wage by Industry.

1985 data in order to correspond to the military data. As shown in Figure 2.5, military income lags behind that of the civilian sector through the ages of 30-34, where military income surpasses civilian income. Military income does not equal the average of civilian clerk income until 6-7 years after graduation from the university.

The result of this comparison raises the question at which year veterans, once they have completed their duty, can catch up to the average income in all civilian occupations? When they decide either to continue military service or to take up civilian employment, they consider income along with many other factors. Yet, as Table 4 illustrates both aptitude and promotion prospects are thought to be more important than income.




Figure 2.2 86 CLK Average Monthly Income Profile.




Figure 2.3 86 ENGINEER Average Monthly Income Profile.




Figure 2.4 86 JET PILOT Average Monthly Income Profile.




Figure 2.5 Clerk Monthly Income Comparison by Age.

TABLE 4
THE STANDARD OF JOB CHOICE

Standard	%
Aptitude	47.2
promotion Prospect	35.0
Income	10.0
Value of Job	4.3
Work-hour	2.0
Don't know	1.5

*Source : adapted from survey by Korea Manager Association in
[Ref. 11: p. 36].

To better illustrated this situation, salaries from an actual company are presented. Kuk Dong Construction company was chosen because of availability of data. As shown in Table 5, a military veteran, with bachelor' degree, who completed his duty may start as a M-1 at age 27.

As shown in Figure 2.6, the range of M-1 salaries are slightly greater than those for military officers with 4 years of service. The range of salaries in Figure 2.6 for each management grade seems to be dependent on performance, not position or tenure at the company. Considering their bonus, income differential may be increased. According to a survey by Korea Manager Association, M-1 start at age 27 and it takes an average 3.9 years to promote to M-3. Also it takes average 3.7 years from M-3 to M-4, 3.6 years from M-4 to M-5 and 3.7 years from M-5 to M-6. It takes an average 15 years from M-1 to M-6. Figure 2.6 shows military income equivalents with all level of managers, by age. The median starting salary of a civilian counterpart are greater than those of military, and pay differentials are growing bigger year to year. [Ref. 11: p. 36].

Of course, whether military income is greater or not than civilian income will depend upon the size and type of company, and it is not known whether the illustrated pay differentials are consistent across all military specialties that are transferable to the civilian job market.

TABLE 5
MANAGEMENT CHART, KUK DONG CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD

(Unit: Won) 31 May, 1986			
Grade	Name	Salary	Min Period for Promotion
M-11	Hoi-Jang	2,030,000	
M-10	Sa-Jang	1,830,000	
M-9	Jeon-Mu	1,350,000	
M-8	Sang-Mu	1,170,000	
M-7	Lee-Sa	1,115,000	
M-6	Bu-Jang	907,000	
M-5	Cha-Jang	759,000	3
M-4	Gua-Jang	655,000	3
M-3	Dae-Ri	545,000	2
M-2	Ju-Im	480,000	2
M-1	Sa-Won	365,000	2

*Note : All managers' salaries do not include bonuses which are corresponding to quarter and semiannual allowances in the military. According to Personnel Regulations, they receive regular bonuses 4 times per year and a special bonus depending on profits.
[Ref. 10: p. 8.3]

Figure 2.6 also raises a question about compensation based on the responsibility and difficulty of each position in civilian and military organizations. This question will be discussed in a later chapter.

C. SUMMARY

The **general** conclusion drawn from data is that for the majority of their careers, military **officers** receive less than their civilian counterparts until about the 10th year after **commissioning**.

Military income lags behind civilian income by approximately 2-3 years as shown in Figure 2.6. However, military officers can look forward to an accelerated growth of annual compensation in later years, a growth not enjoyed by civilians. After 3 years of duty, the officers can leave the military to work for the civilian sector. At this point, civilian pay exceeds military pay.




Figure 2.6 Monthly Military Clerk Income vs Level of Management.

In accordance with traditional economic theory, the pay differentials between civilian and military are likely to be having a negative impact on the recruitment of high quality candidates for the academy cadet program, and retention of military officers with high technical experience who have graduated from a civilian university.

In addition, it is clear that civilian employers prefer military officers with experience and are willing to pay a premium to get them. This is mainly because the military provides more management training and experience than civilian employers.

III. VIEWS OF KOREAN NPS STUDENT OFFICERS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a results of the survey of Korean students at the NPS. The survey was undertaken in order to obtain information which could support policy formation and research necessary for dealing with present and future Korean military compensation issues. The data includes information about the behavior, attitudes, preferences, and intentions of military personnel, assesses the response of officers to current compensation policies, and identifies possible areas for future compensation policy changes.

This survey was conducted on 1 September through 30 September, 1986. Questionnaires were extracted and modified for the Korean students from a 1978 DoD survey. [Ref. 12]

A. SURVEY DOCUMENT

1. Structure and Contents

The survey document is displayed in Appendix C.

Section I, **BACKGROUND (Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6)**, collected basic data such as service, rank, respondent's source of commission, years of service (YOS), current age and martial status when surveyed.

Section II, **MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM (Q7,Q8,Q9,Q10)**, assessed the respondent's future orientation by asking his knowledge of retirement benefits, choice of his retirement pay, expected years of service and expected rank at discharge.

Section III, **MILITARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS (Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14,Q15,Q16)**, collected judgements concerning total pay, basic pay and allowances. This section also determined the respondent's valuation of medical services. In addition, it was designed to collect data about the respondent's housing.

Section IV, **CIVILIAN JOB SEARCH (Q17,Q18,Q19)**, collected data about the respondent's civilian labor market experience and potential civilian earnings. Additionally, each questionnaire measured respondent's views concerning comparative condition, between military and civilian occupations (Q20,Q21,Q22). Furthermore, there are questions on promotion prospects, reasons for entering the military, and overall satisfaction with military life.

2. Limitations and Assumptions

The respondents were Korean officer students at NPS. The objective of the survey, terminology, and how to complete the survey were personally explained to each respondent prior to completing the survey. Respondents' replies were based on what they thought were the best answers to questions. Survey questions were designed with the assumption that constructive changes in Korean military compensation policies can help to overcome problems of recruiting and retention of high quality people.

Consideration was given to the whole sample: their duty station and housing was based on their last station in Korea, and their ranks were as of 1 September 1986. The respondents are divided into two groups: Junior (O2-O3) and Senior (O4-O5). Respondents answered each question by selecting one of four or more available answers.

B. RESULTS OF SURVEY

SPSSX was utilized to compile the results of the survey in figures and tables, contained herein. The results of key questions from each survey section are provided in this section. Remaining questions' results may be found in Appendix D. Data provided by respondents is presented, discussed and compared. However, the emphasis of this section is purposely limited to a presentation of the compiled data without the possible inferences that could be drawn from the information. In the next, and final section, the author analyzes the results and develops a conclusion based upon the findings provided by the survey questionnaires.

1. Background Data Analysis

Sixty eight of 69 surveys distributed were completed. Most of the surveys indicated that the respondents are concerned with current compensation policies. All respondents completed every question (there are no missing values).

Branch, rank, YOS, age and martial status profiles are displayed in Figures 3.1 thorough 3.5.

2. Military Retirement System

As shown in Figure 3.6, most respondents (80.9 %) had a general knowledge of retirement benefits. Only one individual had specific knowledge of all retirement benefits. If the "general knowledge" respondents knew more about the specifics of the retirement benefit, the result might be higher member satisfaction. The responses were not significantly different by rank or service.




Figure 3.1 Respondents by Branch of Service.




Figure 3.2 Respondents by Rank.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0-2	1	2	2.9	2.9	2.9
3-5	2	10	14.7	14.7	17.6
6-8	3	30	44.1	44.1	61.8
9-11	4	24	35.3	35.3	97.1
12-15	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.3 Respondents by YOS.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
24-27	1	5	7.4	7.4	7.4
28-31	2	25	36.8	36.8	44.1
32-35	3	36	52.9	52.9	97.1
36-39	4	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.4 Respondents by Age.




Figure 3.5 Respondents by Martial Status.




Figure 3.6 Knowledge of Retirement Benefit.

As shown in Figure 3.7, the majority of personnel (72 %) chose annuity as the desired method of retirement payment. Four respondents (5.9 %) selected annuity but by a mixed annuity and lump-sum ("other") method.

As shown in Figure 3.8, the overwhelming majority (94.1 %) expected to stay longer than 20 years.

3. Military compensation and Benefits

As shown in Figure 3.9, respondents were split as to the comparison of their pay with the civilian sector. Fifty-one percent found their pay equal to or greater("some extent" to "very great extent") than their civilian counterparts, while 48 percent of respondents believed their pay to be slightly less. By groups, the Junior Group believed their pay to be a little less (45.8%) while the Senior group believed their pay to be equal to or greater than civilian pay, as shown in Appendix E.

Most respondents (60.3%) were dissatisfied with their basic pay, as shown in Figure 3.10. By groups, the Junior Group was more dissatisfied than the Senior Group with basic pay (See Appendix E). However, sixty percent of respondents were satisfied with the military bonus system (Figure 3.11).

As shown in Figure 3.12, 67.6 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with their general allowances. By groups, as shown in Appendix E, the Senior Group (70.5 %) was more dissatisfied than the Junior Group (62.5 %).

Figure 3.13 shows that fifty-six percent of the respondent indicated dissatisfaction with their special allowances. By groups, the Junior group responded dissatisfaction at a 53 percent rate, as indicated in Appendix E.

Approximately forty-six percent of respondents indicated dissatisfaction with supplemental benefits (See Figure 3.14). By groups, the Junior Group was more satisfied with supplemental benefits than the Senior Group, as shown in Appendix E.

In general, respondents seemed to be more satisfied with bonus and supplemental benefits than basic pay, special allowances or general allowances. By groups, the Senior Group was more satisfied with the above five categories except general allowances. For general allowances the Junior Group was more satisfied.

As shown in Figure 3.15, respondents ranked their preferences for changing toward higher satisfaction, as follows: primary special allowances (30.9%), basic pay (23.5%) and general allowances (23.5%), supplemental benefits (14.7%) and bonus (7.4%) categories in that order.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
LUMP-SUM	1	15	22.1	22.1	22.1
ANNUITY	2	49	72.1	72.1	94.1
OTHER	3	4	5.9	5.9	100.0
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.7 Mil. Retirement Preference.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
LT 15	1	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
20-23	3	36	52.9	52.9	58.8
24-27	4	13	19.1	19.1	77.9
28-31	5	12	17.6	17.6	95.6
32-33	6	3	4.4	4.4	100.0
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.8 Expected YOS at Discharge.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A VERY LITTLE	1	8	11.8	11.8	11.8
A LITTLE	2	25	36.8	36.8	48.5
A SOME	3	29	42.6	42.6	91.2
A GREAT	4	5	7.4	7.4	98.5
A VERY GREAT	5	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.9 Comparison of Military and Civilian Pay.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	6	8.8	8.8	8.8
DISSATISFIED	2	15	22.1	22.1	30.9
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	20	29.4	29.4	60.3
SO-SO	4	14	20.6	20.6	80.9
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	7	10.3	10.3	91.2
SATISFIED	6	5	7.4	7.4	98.5
VERY SATISFIED	7	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.10 Mil. Compensation : Basic Pay.




Figure 3.11 Mil. Compensation : QTR/Semiannual Bonus.




Figure 3.12 Mil. Compensation : GEN. Allowances.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	11	16.2	16.2	16.2
DISSATISFIED	2	10	14.7	14.7	30.9
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	17	25.0	25.0	55.9
SO-SO	4	11	16.2	16.2	72.1
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	3	4.4	4.4	76.5
SATISFIED	6	7	10.3	10.3	86.8
VERY SATISFIED	7	9	13.2	13.2	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.13 Mil. Compensation : Special Allowance.

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
DISSATISFIED	2	9	13.2	13.2	19.1
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	18	26.5	26.5	45.6
SO-SO	4	15	22.1	22.1	67.6
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	15	22.1	22.1	89.7
SATISFIED	6	5	7.4	7.4	97.1
VERY SATISFIED	7	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.14 Mil. Compensation : Supplemental Benefit.




Figure 3.15 Compensation Policy Preference.

4. Civilian Job Search

The intent of these questions was to determine what set of military job conditions were preferred to civilian job conditions and the extent to which preferences of job condition existed. The data clearly indicated that respondents consider the following aspects of military life to be superior to the civilian sector:

- Supervisors
- Decision participation
- Retirement benefits
- Medical benefits
- Promotion prospects
- Training opportunities
- Job security.

But the following conditions were considered inferior to civilian job conditions:

- Chance for challenge
- Wage and salaries
- Co-worker relations
- Work schedules
- Facilities & equipment
- Location of job.

As shown in Figure 3.16, eighteen percent of the responses indicated that the civilian sector was better than the military sector, when asked about comparison of supervision. A 3 x 5 matrix is presented in Appendix E which portrays the relationships between the branch of service and level of preference. Chi square tests are also applied to determine the significance of row and column' independence. Chi square indicates the frequencies are significant beyond the .05 level.

C. SUMMARY


The respondents indicated the following reasons for joining the military in order of preference(Q21): Pride of serving in the armed forces (30.9%), promotion prospects (20.6%), patriotism (14.7%), education benefit (13.2%) and monetary compensation (13.2%). Thirteen percent of respondents were dissatisfied with military life, but 64.7 percent of respondents were satisfied. Further, the Senior Group felt greater satisfaction than the Junior Group; that is, the higher the rank, the greater the satisfaction with the military.

All but one respondent did not know their exact retirement benefits; they only had a general level of knowledge. Therefore, they perceived the retirement benefits to be less than the actual value. A majority of respondents want to serve for 20 years or longer and desire to receive a retirement annuity.

Present pay policies are not satisfactory to a proportion (44.8%) of all respondents. They feel that their total pay is not equitable to their civilian counterpart doing the same type of work. By groups, the Junior Group indicated their pay to be less comparable with civilian pay than did the Senior Group.

SUPERVISOR COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	11	16.2	16.2	17.6
SAME	3	35	51.5	51.5	69.1
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	19	27.9	27.9	97.1
A LOT WORSE	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	



DECISION PARTICIPATION COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	2	2.9	2.9	2.9
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	15	22.1	22.1	25.0
SAME	3	29	42.6	42.6	67.6
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	22	32.4	32.4	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	





Figure 3.16 Civilian Job Search.

RETIREMENT BENEFIT COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	5	7.4	7.4	7.4
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	18	26.5	26.5	33.3
SAME	3	19	27.9	27.9	61.3
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	19	27.9	27.9	89.7
A LOT WORSE	5	7	10.3	10.3	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	



MEDICAL BENEFIT COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	5	7.4	7.4	13.2
SAME	3	24	35.3	35.3	48.5
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	27	39.7	39.7	88.2
A LOT WORSE	5	8	11.8	11.8	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.16 Civilian Job Search. (cont'd.)

PROMOTION COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	8	11.8	11.8	13.2
SAME	3	31	45.6	45.6	58.8
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	24	35.3	35.3	94.1
A LOT WORSE	5	4	5.9	5.9	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	



TRAINING OPPORTUNITY COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	8	11.8	11.8	13.2
SAME	3	26	38.2	38.2	51.5
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	31	45.6	45.6	97.1
A LOT WORSE	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	





Figure 3.16 Civilian Job Search. (cont'd.)

COWORKER RELATION COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	5	7.4	7.4	7.4
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	14	20.6	20.6	27.9
SAME	3	36	52.9	52.9	80.9
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	13	19.1	19.1	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	



JOB SECURITY COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	9	13.2	13.2	13.2
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	11	16.2	16.2	29.4
SAME	3	16	23.5	23.5	52.9
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	29	42.6	42.6	95.6
A LOT WORSE	5	3	4.4	4.4	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	




Figure 3.16 Civilian Job Search. (cont'd.)

Respondents indicated that they expected some difficulty in finding a civilian job at discharge, but fifty of the respondents indicated that they could use their skills in the civilian sector with a probability of .5. Positive job conditions to the military were important to the career officer in deciding to remain in the military. Obviously, the degree to which and the condition in which the military officer's expectations are filled will determine the degree of positive behavior and productivity of the individuals to our military organization.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research has examined current military compensation policies with a view toward identifying and recommending the most appropriate compensation policies for the Korean career officer corps in the early 21st Century.

Through literature searches, privately-obtained data, and a survey of Korean officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School, significant amounts of relevant data were collected. This analysis is directed toward determination of compensation policy changes that are necessary to insure the Korean military attracts and maintains the right quantity and quality of career officer personnel needed in future years.

A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our comparison of military and civilian pay policies and practices highlighted several differences. Foremost was the difference between the two sectors in their use of market "supply and demand" in deciding compensation policies. Whereas the civilian sector emphasizes a market approach, it is clear that the military still bases the majority of its compensation decisions on institutional grounds. Nonetheless, it also is clear that the military is ever-increasingly relying on market approach considerations, as it faces the difficult task of manning the career ranks of the armed forces in an increasingly competitive marketplace.

Another difference between the military and civilian sectors is the level of pay for university-educated professionals. While career military officers receive greater allowances and special pays overall, it is clear the pay received by like-qualified professionals in the civilian economy is significantly higher. Further, this pay disparity differs for different occupations and is most apparent in the years immediately following graduation.

After 10 or more years of military service or civilian work experience, however, the disparity tends to disappear. Accordingly, for purposes of defining the target group for possible compensation policy changes, it is clear the period between the end of obligatory duty and 10 years of service is the most critical and deserving of attention.

To provide the military with adequate numbers and quality of career officers within this target area, the author believes that changes in the current compensation

policies will be necessary and the military will be required to reflect a much greater emphasis on "supply and demand" considerations in their compensation policy considerations. Specifically, the author believes that compensation increases, directed to the shortage skill areas, will be required. However, the author believes that desired improvements in retention can be achieved if these compensation increases were granted in the form of adjustments in allowances rather than across-the-board increases in basic pay. Using changes in allowances rather than basic pay would offer two advantages: it would allow the Korean military to target pay more toward specific skill problem areas, and it would avoid the long-term cost implications that an across-the-board pay increase creates in terms of retirement costs and other public employee salary levels. Accordingly, the author recommends that the Korean military gives serious consideration to increasing the authority for the payment of allowances to career military officers with between 3 and 10 years of service. Further, the author recommends that such authority allows military managers to vary the amounts of increases in accordance with developing specific-skill retention problems. In addition, the author recommends the added allowances only be paid when manpower analysts determine that manning problems are about to occur. Finally, the author recommends that the added allowances be paid only temporarily, for the duration of the manning problem. In this way, a limited amount of added compensation funds can be used to counter career officer retention problems in the most efficient way.

Another difference between military and civilian pay policies that merits discussion concerns promotion. In the military, the emphasis for promotion is on years of service. In the civilian sector, performance, rather than seniority, appears to be the most critical factor. In the author's view, the military policy is not prompting the level of sacrifice that is apparent in the civilian sector, and the author believes that if a greater emphasis was placed on performance and a somewhat less emphasis was placed on years of service, individual productivity would increase. Accordingly, the author recommends that Korea military officers give serious consideration to amending promotion standards, with greater emphasis placed on performance and a somewhat lesser emphasis placed on years of service. Following this policy change, it would be important for the Korean military to fully and completely explain the new standards to all impacted military personnel.

Yet another difference between the Korean military and civilian sector concerns the relative value and transferability of the skills obtained in service or employment.

Whereas many young officers will leave the military in order to obtain civilian jobs, many other high-quality officers, who may have entered the military with that intention, will decide to stay. As a result, the military benefits from retaining high quality career personnel. As some portion of all entering officer classes will remain in the military, it is in the best interest of the military to insure that entering classes are of the highest quality, and an officer's knowledge of skill marketability will aid in achieving this goal. Accordingly, the author recommends that efforts be expended to publicize and inform potential officer candidates about the civilian job implications of military officer service.

The results of the survey of Korean officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School supports these conclusions and recommendations. For example:

1. The survey demonstrated that a military member's perceptions of compensation policies and areas for constructive changes can be obtained and quantified.
2. Because of the perceived gap with civilian wage levels, respondents expressed dissatisfaction with their basic pay and allowances.
3. However, they viewed policies concerning bonuses and supplemental benefits as more acceptable.
4. They identified many pluses and negatives of military services.
5. Respondents believe that the current pay system, with its lower basic pay line in relation to civilian pay, relies heavily on bonus and supplemental benefits, like deferred income, and does not provide a strong incentive to long term career commitment by high qualified young officers.
6. Respondents did not know exactly how much they received. It would be useful for the military to better explain their compensation policies and the results of compensation comparisons between the military and civilian sector.
7. One of the most frequently cited causes of discontent in the military was job dissatisfaction. The survey showed that dissatisfaction with job conditions affected the decision that the young officer, especially graduates of civilian universities, is faced with when asked the question "stay in or get out".

B. SUMMARY

Through the survey analysis, various manpower approaches were identified that could be used to tap the maximum potential of available human resources in relation to the **emerging** problem of recruiting and retaining high quality people. Further, it would be **useful** if, on a yearly basis, the Korean military would survey pay differentials between **military** and civilians and then use the data when considering constructive compensation policy changes. Clearly, this would allow explicit pay standards that are more timely and accurate, and a more finely adjusted basic pay schedule could result.

Also, the Korean military should continue to compare civilian pay and military pay based on total compensation, considering all pay and fringe benefits, and publicize the results in order to change the civilian perception of the military's pay and benefits and provide military personnel and prospective candidates with a better understanding of military compensation.

Finally, the Korean military commanders and manpower managers should strive to remove as many of the undesirable job conditions that currently exist, thereby attracting higher quality young officers.

As the Korean economy steadily strengthens, the Korean military must find the most efficient and effective way to increase total combat readiness in order to deter North Korean forces. Manpower and weapon resources management will be essential in maintaining the combat edge.

In the 21st Century, the Korean military will be faced with lower manpower ceilings, while requiring high skilled officers and enlisted personnel to operate the technically advanced weapon systems acquired. The recruitment and retention of high quality personnel is essential.

Adoption of the compensation policy changes recommended herein could help the Korean military to overcome these problems in the most efficient way possible.

APPENDIX A
86 BASIC PAY MATRIX

Step	O-1	O-2	O-3	O-4	O-5	UNIT : WON O-6
1	157300	173900	227400	281300	340900	393200
2	167300	184400	240000	295700	356000	407900
3	177300	194900	252600	310100	371100	422600
4		205400	265200	324500	386200	437300
5		215900	277800	338900	401300	452000
6		226400	290400	353300	416400	466700
7		236900	303000	367700	431500	481400
8			315600	382100	446600	496100
9			328200	396500	461700	510800
10			340800	410900	476800	525500
11			353400	425300	491900	540200
12			366000	439700	507000	554900
13				454100	522100	569600
14				468500	537200	584400
15					552300	599000

APPENDIX B

GUIDE FOR ALLOWANCES PAY

1. GENERAL ALLOWANCES

a. Quarter Allowances

All active officers receive this allowance four times per year.

The amount is figured out like this:

QTR Allowance = $(\sum \text{Basic Pay paid at the end of every fiscal Quarter})/3$

b. Semiannual Allowances

All active duty officers receive this allowance two times per year. The amount starts 50 percent of Basic Pay for their pay grade, incremental increase 5 percent of 50 percent untill 100 percent.

c. Family Allowance

During their years of active duty, military personnel receive a supplement corresponding to the number of children they have.

d. Long term Continuation Allowance

All officers differ on this allowance depending on years of service.

e. Housing Allowance

O-3 to O-5 who are off base residents, that is, live in a civilian house, receive the same amount of money.

f. Activity Allowance

All officers except O-2 and O-1 receive this allowance depending on Rank.

2. SPECIAL DUTY ALLOWANCES

a. Allowance for hazardous duty

Criteria : Rank and YOS. **Recipient :** Demolition duty officer, Parachute duty officer and **Electric** technician who work in 3300 V.

b. Flight Allowance

Criteria : Rank and Aircraft type. **Recipient :** Jet, Prop and Hel pilot, Navigator, Airborne mechanic, Navigator and Weaponoperator, Flight mdical officer.

c. Technical Allowance

Criteria : Rank and YOS. **Recipient :** Aircraft mechanic, Electronic Technician, Vehicle Maintenance mechanic, Air traffic controller, Computer programmer.

d. Allowance for Legal/ Medical/ Religious officer

Criteria : Speciality. Recipient : All Legal, Medical, Religious officer

e. Allowance for Instructor

Criteria : Academy, AFTS, AF college and YOS. Recipient : Instructor in criteria institution.

f. Allowance for Isolated duty

Criteria : Service and work in DMZ and Sea duty or isolated area. Recipient : Only non-officer

g. Incentive Allowance for Speciality

Criteria : Those who continue to remain in military after sacred duty.
Recipient : Medical, Legal, Religion officer

APPENDIX C

SURVEY FORM

I. BACKGROUND

1. In what services are you serving?
☐ Army ☐ Navy ☐ Marine Corps ☐ Air Force
2. What is your present rank?
Rank ☐ O1 ☐ O2 ☐ O3 ☐ O4 ☐ O5 ☐ O6
3. Through which of the following officer procurement programs did you obtain your commission?
☐ Academy Graduate
☐ 2nd Academy Graduate
☐ ROTC / University
☐ Other
4. To the nearest year and month, how long have you been on active duty? Count time spent at prior enlisted service.
☐ 0-2 ☐ 3-5 ☐ 6-8 ☐ 9-11 ☐ 12-15 ☐ GT 16
5. How old were you on your last birthday?
☐ 24-27 ☐ 28-31 ☐ 32-35 ☐ 36-39
6. What is your marital status NOW?
☐ Married ☐ Single, never married ☐ Other

II. MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

7. Do you know what your retirement benefit will be?
☐ Not at all ☐ Generally ☐ Specifically
8. If you had a choice, which military retirement pay would you choose?
☐ lump-sum ☐ Annuity ☐ Other(specify)
9. When **you finally** leave the military, how many total years of service do you expect to have?
☐ LT 15 ☐ 16-19 ☐ 20-23
☐ 24-27 ☐ 28-31 ☐ 32-33
10. When you finally leave the military, what rank do you think you will have? (Mark one)

OFFICER GRADES

- ☐ O4 ☐ O5 ☐ O6 ☐ O7
☐ O8 ☐ O9 ☐ O10

III. MILITARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

11. To what extent is your total pay equitable to your civilian counterpart doing the same type of work?

- ☐ To a very little extent
- ☐ To a little extent
- ☐ To a some extent
- ☐ To a great extent
- ☐ To a very great extent

12. Considering your present compensation and duty assignment, do you feel that your compensation is:

	Dissatisfied				Satisfied			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Basic Pay					1	2	3	4 5 6 7
Bonus					1	2	3	4 5 6 7
General Allowances					1	2	3	4 5 6 7
Special Allowances					1	2	3	4 5 6 7
Supplemental Benefit					1	2	3	4 5 6 7

13. If you had authority to change Korean Military Pay Policies for one of the above five categories of compensation,

A. What category would you change?

Specify()

B. Why would you make this change?

specify()

14. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with medical care in the military?

Dissatisfied				Satisfied			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

15. In what type of housing did you live at previous duty station in KOREA? (Mark one)

☐ I lived in civilian housing.

☐ I lived in military housing.

16. Which of the following best describes your main reason for living in civilian housing? (Mark one)

☐ I was not eligible to live in military housing.

☐ I was waiting to be assigned to military housing

☐ Military housing was not available.

☐ I preferred civilian housing.

☐ I had other reasons.

O I lived in military housing.

IV. CIVILIAN JOB SEARCH

17. If you were to leave the service NOW and try to find a civilian job, how likely would you be to find a GOOD CIVILIAN JOB? (Mark one)

- ☐ (0 in 10) No chance
- ☐ (1 in 10) Very slight possibility
- ☐ (2 in 10) Slight possibility
- ☐ (3 in 10) Some possibility
- ☐ (4 in 10) Fair possibility
- ☐ (5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
- ☐ (6 in 10) Good possibility
- ☐ (7 in 10) Probable
- ☐ (8 in 10) Very probable
- ☐ (9 in 10) Almost sure
- ☐ (10 in 10) Certain
- ☐ Don't know

18. Suppose you were to leave the service NOW and try to find a civilian job. How likely would you be to find a civilian job that uses the SKILLS IN YOUR MILITARY CAREER FIELD?

- ☐ (0 in 10) No chance
- ☐ (1 in 10) Very slight possibility
- ☐ (2 in 10) Slight possibility
- ☐ (3 in 10) Some possibility
- ☐ (4 in 10) Fair possibility
- ☐ (5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
- ☐ (6 in 10) Good possibility
- ☐ (7 in 10) Probable
- ☐ (8 in 10) Very probable
- ☐ (9 in 10) Almost sure
- ☐ (10 in 10) Certain
- ☐ Don't know

19. If you were to leave the service NOW and take a civilian job, how do you think that job would compare with your last military job in Korea in regard to the following work conditions?

- 1 : Civilian job would be a lot better.
- 2 : Civilian job would be slightly better.
- 3 : About the same in a civilian and military job.

4 : Civilian job would be slightly worse.

5 : Civilian job would be a lot worse.

The immediate supervisors

1 2 3 4 5

Having a say in what happens to me

1 2 3 4 5

The retirement benefits

1 2 3 4 5

The medical benefits

1 2 3 4 5

The change for interesting and
challenging work

1 2 3 4 5

The wage or salaries

1 2 3 4 5

The chance for promotion

1 2 3 4 5

The people work with

1 2 3 4 5

The work schedule and hours of work

1 2 3 4 5

The job security

1 2 3 4 5

The equipment I would use on the job

1 2 3 4 5

The location of job

1 2 3 4 5

WE'VE COVERED A LOT OF DIFFERENT TOPICS IN THIS SURVEY. NOW,
THERE ARE SOME QUESTIONS ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT.

20. Think for a minute about other military personnel who have the same total years of service that you have. Which of the following statements best describes when you expect your next promotion?

O EARLIER than most people who have the same total years of service.

O AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME as most people who have the same total years of service.

O LATER than most people who have the same total years of service.

21. Below are a number of reasons officer candidates may have had for joining the military. Which items were the most important to you? Rank your selection in order of your priority.

1. Pride of serving in Armed Forces

2. Camaraderie

3. Needed a job

4. Promotion prospect

5. Education benefit

6. Monetary compensation

7. Patriotism

8. Skill specific training opportunities

9. Other(specify)

1st: _____ 2nd: _____ 3rd: _____

22. Taking all things together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the military as a way of life? Mark one number on the line below.

- ☐ Very dissatisfied
- ☐ Dissatisfied
- ☐ Slightly dissatisfied
- ☐ So-so
- ☐ Slightly satisfied
- ☐ Satisfied
- ☐ Very satisfied

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

APPENDIX D STATISTICS DATA OF SURVEY RESULTS

Q1 RESPONDENTS BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
ARMY	1	32	47.1	47.1	47.1
NAVY	2	12	17.6	17.6	64.7
AIR FORCE	3	24	35.3	35.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.882	STD DEV	.907	MEDIAN	2.000

Q2 RESPONDENTS BY RANK

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0-2	2	2	2.9	2.9	2.9
0-3	3	22	32.4	32.4	35.3
0-4	4	42	61.8	61.8	97.1
0-5	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.647	STD DEV	.593	MEDIAN	4.000

Q3 RESPONDENTS BY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
ACADEMY	1	66	97.1	97.1	97.1
2ND ACADEMY GRADUATE	2	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.029	STD DEV	.170	MEDIAN	1.000

Q4 RESPONDENTS BY YOS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0-2	1	2	2.9	2.9	2.9
3-5	2	10	14.7	14.7	17.6
6-8	3	30	44.1	44.1	61.8
9-11	4	24	35.3	35.3	97.1
12-15	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.206	STD DEV	.839	MEDIAN	3.000

Q5 RESPONDENTS BY AGE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
24-27	1	5	7.4	7.4	7.4
28-31	2	25	36.8	36.8	44.1

32-35	3	36	52.9	52.9	97.1
36-39	4	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.515	STD DEV	.680	MEDIAN	3.000

Q6 RESPONDENTS BY MARTIAL STATUS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MARRIED	1	62	91.2	91.2	91.2
SINGLE	2	6	8.8	8.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.088	STD DEV	.286	MEDIAN	1.000

Q7 KNOWLEDGE OF RETIREMENT BENEFIT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
NOT AT ALL	1	12	17.6	17.6	17.6
GENERALLY	2	55	80.9	80.9	98.5
SPECIFICALLY	3	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.838	STD DEV	.409	MEDIAN	2.000

Q8 MIL. RETIREMENT PREFERENCE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
LUMP-SUM	1	15	22.1	22.1	22.1
ANNUITY	2	49	72.1	72.1	94.1
OTHER	3	4	5.9	5.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.838	STD DEV	.507	MEDIAN	2.000

Q9 EXPECTED YOS AT DISCHARGE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
LT 15	1	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
20-23	3	36	52.9	52.9	58.8
24-27	4	13	19.1	19.1	77.9
28-31	5	12	17.6	17.6	95.6
32-33	6	3	4.4	4.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.559	STD DEV	1.111	MEDIAN	3.000

Q11 EXPECTED RANK AT DISCHARGE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0-5	2	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
0-6	3	34	50.0	50.0	55.9
0-7	4	11	16.2	16.2	72.1
0-8	5	14	20.6	20.6	92.6

0-9	6	3	4.4	4.4	97.1
0-10	7	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.765	STD DEV	1.161	MEDIAN	3.000

Q11 COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND CIVILION PAY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A VERY LITTLE	1	8	11.8	11.8	11.8
A LITTLE	2	25	36.8	36.8	48.5
A SOME	3	29	42.6	42.6	91.2
A GREAT	4	5	7.4	7.4	98.5
A VERY GREAT	5	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.500	STD DEV	.855	MEDIAN	3.000

Q12A MIL. COMPENSATION : BASIC PAY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	6	8.8	8.8	8.8
DISSATISFIED	2	15	22.1	22.1	30.9
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	20	29.4	29.4	60.3
SO-SO	4	14	20.6	20.6	80.9
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	7	10.3	10.3	91.2
SATISFIED	6	5	7.4	7.4	98.5
VERY SATISFIED	7	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.294	STD DEV	1.425	MEDIAN	3.000

Q12B MIL. COMPENSATION : QTR/SEMIANNUAL BONUS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	2	2.9	2.9	2.9
DISSATISFIED	2	1	1.5	1.5	4.4
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	10	14.7	14.7	19.1
SO-SO	4	13	19.1	19.1	38.2
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	13	19.1	19.1	57.4
SATISFIED	6	14	20.6	20.6	77.9
VERY SATISFIED	7	15	22.1	22.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	5.000	STD DEV	1.583	MEDIAN	5.000

Q12C MIL. COMPENSATION : GEN. ALLOWANCE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	15	22.1	22.1	22.1
DISSATISFIED	2	10	14.7	14.7	36.8
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	21	30.9	30.9	67.6
SO-SO	4	13	19.1	19.1	86.8
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	7	10.3	10.3	97.1
SATISFIED	6	1	1.5	1.5	98.5
VERY SATISFIED	7	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	

		TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.912	STD DEV	1.422	MEDIAN		3.000

Q12D MIL. COMPENSATION : SPECIAL ALLOWANCE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	11	16.2	16.2	16.2
DISSATISFIED	2	10	14.7	14.7	30.9
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	17	25.0	25.0	55.9
SO-SO	4	11	16.2	16.2	72.1
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	3	4.4	4.4	76.5
SATISFIED	6	7	10.3	10.3	86.8
VERY SATISFIED	7	9	13.2	13.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.618	STD DEV	1.963	MEDIAN		3.000
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Q12E MIL. COMPENSATION : SUPPLEMENT BENEFIT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
DISSATISFIED	2	9	13.2	13.2	19.1
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	18	26.5	26.5	45.6
SO-SO	4	15	22.1	22.1	67.6
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	15	22.1	22.1	89.7
SATISFIED	6	5	7.4	7.4	97.1
VERY SATISFIED	7	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.750	STD DEV	1.439	MEDIAN		4.000
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Q13 COMPENSATION POLICY PREFERENCE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
BASIC PAY	1	16	23.5	23.5	23.5
QTR/SEMI BONUS	2	5	7.4	7.4	30.9
GENERAL ALLOWANCES	3	16	23.5	23.5	54.4
SPECIAL ALLOWANCES	4	21	30.9	30.9	85.3
SUPPLEMENT BENEFITS	5	10	14.7	14.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.059	STD DEV	1.392	MEDIAN		3.000
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Q14 VALUE OF MEDICAL BENEFIT

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	7	10.3	10.3	10.3
DISSATISFIED	2	22	32.4	32.4	42.6
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	19	27.9	27.9	70.6
SO-SO	4	10	14.7	14.7	85.3
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	4	5.9	5.9	91.2
SATISFIED	6	6	8.8	8.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN	3.000	STD DEV	1.393	MEDIAN		3.000
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Q15 TYPES OF HOUSING

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CIV. HOUSING	1	26	38.2	38.2	38.2
MIL. HOUSING	2	42	61.8	61.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	1.618	STD DEV	.490	MEDIAN	2.000

Q16 REASON FOR CHOOSING CIVILIAN HOUSING

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
WAIT TO BE ASSIGNED	2	8	11.8	11.8	11.8
NOT AVAILABLE	3	11	16.2	16.2	27.9
PREFER	4	5	7.4	7.4	35.3
OTHER REASON	5	2	2.9	2.9	38.2
LIVE IN MIL HOUSING	6	42	61.8	61.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.868	STD DEV	1.554	MEDIAN	6.000

Q17 PROBABILITY OF FINDING A CIV. JOB

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0 IN 10	1	3	4.4	4.4	4.4
1-2 IN 10	2	19	27.9	27.9	32.4
3-4 IN 10	3	15	22.1	22.1	54.4
5-6 IN 10	4	6	8.8	8.8	63.2
7-8 IN 10	5	11	16.2	16.2	79.4
9-10 IN 10	6	6	8.8	8.8	88.2
DO NOT KNOW	7	8	11.8	11.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.779	STD DEV	1.819	MEDIAN	3.000

Q18 TRANSFERING MIL. SKILL TO CIV. JOB

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
0 IN 10	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
1-2 IN 10	2	17	25.0	25.0	26.5
3-4 IN 10	3	16	23.5	23.5	50.0
5-6 IN 10	4	8	11.8	11.8	61.8
7-8 IN 10	5	11	16.2	16.2	77.9
9-10 IN 10	6	13	19.1	19.1	97.1
DO NOT KNOW	7	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.853	STD DEV	1.605	MEDIAN	3.500

Q19A SUPERVISOR COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	11	16.2	16.2	17.6

SAME	3	35	51.5	51.5	69.1
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	19	27.9	27.9	97.1
A LOT WORSE	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.147 STD DEV .778 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19B DECISION PARTICIPATION COMPARIOSN

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	2	2.9	2.9	2.9
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	15	22.1	22.1	25.0
SAME	3	29	42.6	42.6	67.6
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	22	32.4	32.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.044 STD DEV .818 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19C RETIREMENT BENEFIT COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	5	7.4	7.4	7.4
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	18	26.5	26.5	33.8
SAME	3	19	27.9	27.9	61.8
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	19	27.9	27.9	89.7
A LOT WORSE	5	6	8.8	8.8	98.5
	6	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.074 STD DEV 1.124 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19D MEDICAL BENEFIT COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	4	5.9	5.9	5.9
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	5	7.4	7.4	13.2
SAME	3	24	35.3	35.3	48.5
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	27	39.7	39.7	88.2
A LOT WORSE	5	8	11.8	11.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.441 STD DEV .998 MEDIAN 4.000

Q19E CHANCE FOR CHALLENGE COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	7	10.3	10.3	10.3
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	37	54.4	54.4	64.7
SAME	3	15	22.1	22.1	86.8
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	9	13.2	13.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 2.382 STD DEV .847 MEDIAN 2.000

Q19F WAGES AND SALARIES COMPARIOSN

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	9	13.2	13.2	13.2
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	42	61.8	61.8	75.0
SAME	3	9	13.2	13.2	88.2
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	8	11.8	11.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 2.235 STD DEV .831 MEDIAN 2.000

Q19G PROMOTION COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	8	11.8	11.8	13.2
SAME	3	31	45.6	45.6	58.8
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	24	35.3	35.3	94.1
A LOT WORSE	5	4	5.9	5.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.324 STD DEV .818 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19H TRAINING OPPORTUNITY COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	8	11.8	11.8	13.2
SAME	3	26	38.2	38.2	51.5
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	31	45.6	45.6	97.1
A LOT WORSE	5	2	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.368 STD DEV .790 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19I COWORKER RELATION COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	5	7.4	7.4	7.4
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	14	20.6	20.6	27.9
SAME	3	36	52.9	52.9	80.9
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	13	19.1	19.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 2.838 STD DEV .822 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19J WORK SCHEDULE COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	11	16.2	16.2	16.2
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	23	33.8	33.8	50.0
SAME	3	16	23.5	23.5	73.5
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	15	22.1	22.1	95.6
A LOT WORSE	5	3	4.4	4.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 2.647 STD DEV 1.130 MEDIAN 2.500

Q19K JOB SECURITY COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	9	13.2	13.2	13.2
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	11	16.2	16.2	29.4
SAME	3	16	23.5	23.5	52.9
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	29	42.6	42.6	95.6
A LOT WORSE	5	3	4.4	4.4	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 3.088 STD DEV 1.143 MEDIAN 3.000

Q19L FACILITIES /EQUIP. COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	11	16.2	16.2	16.2
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	33	48.5	48.5	64.7
SAME	3	16	23.5	23.5	88.2
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	8	11.8	11.8	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 2.309 STD DEV .885 MEDIAN 2.000

Q19M LOCATION COMPARISON

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
A LOT BETTER	1	20	29.4	29.4	29.4
SLIGHTLY BETTER	2	32	47.1	47.1	76.5
SAME	3	13	19.1	19.1	95.6
SLIGHTLY WORSE	4	3	4.4	4.4	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 1.985 STD DEV .819 MEDIAN 2.000

Q20 PROMOTION PROSPECTS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
EARLIER	1	14	20.6	20.6	20.6
SAME TIME	2	39	57.4	57.4	77.9
LATER	3	15	22.1	22.1	100.0
TOTAL		68	100.0	100.0	

MEAN 2.015 STD DEV .658 MEDIAN 2.000

Q21 REASONS FOR MIL. SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
PRIDE	1	21	30.9	30.9	30.9
NEEDED JOB	3	4	5.9	5.9	36.8
PROMOTION	4	14	20.6	20.6	57.4
EDUCATION	5	9	13.2	13.2	70.6
MONETARY	6	9	13.2	13.2	83.8
PATRIOTISM	7	10	14.7	14.7	98.5

OTHER	9	1	1.5	1.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.926	STD DEV	2.294	MEDIAN	4.000
Q22	SATISFACTION WITH MIL. LIFE				
VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5
DISSATISFIED	2	3	4.4	4.4	5.9
SLIGHTLY DISSATISFIED	3	5	7.4	7.4	13.2
SO-SO	4	15	22.1	22.1	35.3
SLIGHTLY SATISFIED	5	22	32.4	32.4	67.6
SATISFIED	6	16	23.5	23.5	91.2
VERY SATISFIED	7	6	8.8	8.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	TOTAL	68	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	4.853	STD DEV	1.319	MEDIAN	5.000

APPENDIX E

CROSSTABULATION OF Q11 AND Q12 BY GROUP

Q11																	
Q2X	COUNT	I															
	ROW PCT	IA	VERY L	A LITTLE	A SOME	A GREAT	A VERY G	ROW									
		I	I	I	I	I	REAT	5I	TOTAL								
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I										
JUNIOR	1.00	I	3	I	11	I	9	I	I	1	I	24					
		I	12.5	I	45.8	I	37.5	I	I	4.2	I	35.3					
SENIOR	2.00	I	5	I	14	I	20	I	5	I	I	44					
		I	11.4	I	31.8	I	45.5	I	11.4	I	I	64.7					
COLUMN TOTAL			8		25		29		5		1	68					
			11.8		36.8		42.6		7.4		1.5	100.0					
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.		CELLS WITH E.F. < 5									
5.63776	4	0.2279				0.353		5 OF 10 (50.0%)									
Q12A																	
Q2X	COUNT	I															
	ROW PCT	IVERY	DIS	DISSATIS	SLIGHTLY	SO-SO	SLIGHTL	SATISFIE	VERY SAT	ROW							
		ISATISFIE	FIED	DISSATI	DISSATI		Y SATISF	D	ISFIED	TOTAL							
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I	6I	7I								
JUNIOR	1.00	I	2	I	6	I	8	I	4	I	2	I	24				
		I	8.3	I	25.0	I	33.3	I	16.7	I	8.3	I	35.3				
SENIOR	2.00	I	4	I	9	I	12	I	10	I	5	I	44				
		I	9.1	I	20.5	I	27.3	I	22.7	I	11.4	I	64.7				
COLUMN TOTAL			6		15		20		14		7		68				
			8.8		22.1		29.4		20.6		10.3		7.4	1.5	100.0		
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.		CELLS WITH E.F. < 5									
1.35902	6	0.9683				0.353		9 OF 14 (64.3%)									
Q12B																	
Q2X	COUNT	I															
	ROW PCT	IVERY	DIS	DISSATIS	SLIGHTLY	SO-SO	SLIGHTL	SATISFIE	VERY SAT	ROW							
		ISATISFIE	FIED	DISSATI	DISSATI		Y SATISF	D	ISFIED	TOTAL							
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I	6I	7I								
JUNIOR	1.00	I	1	I	1	I	4	I	6	I	6	I	3	I	24		
		I	4.2	I	4.2	I	16.7	I	25.0	I	25.0	I	12.5	I	12.5	I	35.3
SENIOR	2.00	I	1	I	I	6	I	7	I	7	I	11	I	12	I	44	
		I	2.3	I	I	13.6	I	15.9	I	15.9	I	25.0	I	27.3	I	64.7	
COLUMN TOTAL			2		1		10		13		13		14		15		68
			2.9		1.5		14.7		19.1		19.1		20.6		22.1		100.0
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.		CELLS WITH E.F. < 5									
6.17729	6	0.4036				0.353		8 OF 14 (57.1%)									

Q2X		ISATISFIE FIED		DISSATI		Y SATISF D		ISFIED		TOTAL
		I	II	2I	3I	4I	5I	6I	7I	
JUNIOR	1.00	I	3 I	5 I	7 I	4 I	3 I	1 I	1 I	24
		I	12.5 I	20.8 I	29.2 I	16.7 I	12.5 I	4.2 I	4.2 I	35.3
SENIOR	2.00	I	12 I	5 I	14 I	9 I	4 I	I	I	44
		I	27.3 I	11.4 I	31.8 I	20.5 I	9.1 I	I	I	64.7
COLUMN TOTAL			15	10	21	13	7	1	1	68
			22.1	14.7	30.9	19.1	10.3	1.5	1.5	100.0

CHI-SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F. < 5

6.47723 6 0.3719 0.353 8 OF 14 (57.1%)

Q12D

COUNT ROW PCT	Q2X											ROW TOTAL
	EVERY DIS		DISSATIS		SLIGHTLY SO-SO		SLIGHTL SATISFIE		VERY SAT			
	ISATISFIE	FIED	DISSATI		Y SATISF D		ISFIED					
	I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I	6I	7I				
1.00	I	3 I	4 I	8 I	6 I	I	I	2 I	I	1 I	24	
	I	12.5 I	16.7 I	33.3 I	25.0 I	I	I	8.3 I	I	4.2 I	35.3	
2.00	I	8 I	6 I	9 I	5 I	3 I	I	5 I	I	8 I	44	
	I	18.2 I	13.6 I	20.5 I	11.4 I	6.8 I	I	11.4 I	I	18.2 I	64.7	
COLUMN TOTAL		11	10	17	11	3		7		9	68	
		16.2	14.7	25.0	16.2	4.4		10.3		13.2	100.0	

0 CHI-SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F. < 5

7.30192 6 0.2938 1.059 8 OF 14 (57.1%)

Q12E

Q2X	COUNT ROW PCT	EVERY DIS		DISSATIS		SLIGHTLY SO-SO		SLIGHTL SATISFIE		VERY SAT		ROW TOTAL
		ISATISFIE	FIED	DISSATI		Y SATISF D		ISFIED				
JUNIOR	1.00	I	2 I	3 I	6 I	3 I	6 I	3 I	1 I			24
		I	8.3 I	12.5 I	25.0 I	12.5 I	25.0 I	12.5 I	4.2 I			35.3
SENIOR	2.00	I	2 I	6 I	12 I	12 I	9 I	2 I	1 I			44
		I	4.5 I	13.6 I	27.3 I	27.3 I	20.5 I	4.5 I	2.3 I			64.7
COLUMN TOTAL			4	9	18	15	15	5	2			68
			5.9	13.2	26.5	22.1	22.1	7.4	2.9			100.0

CHI-SQUARE D.F. SIGNIFICANCE MIN E.F. CELLS WITH E.F. < 5

3.63182 6 0.7264 0.706 7 OF 14 (50.0%)

APPENDIX F

CROSSTABULATION OF Q19 BY SERVICE

		Q19A										
Q1	ROW PCT	COUNT	I	IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME	SLIGHTLY	A LOT	NO	ROW TOTAL
		ITTER	I	II	2I	3I	4I	5I				
									BETTER	WORSE	RSE	
ARMY	1	I		I	5	I	16	I	11	I	I	32
		I		I	15.6	I	50.0	I	34.4	I	I	47.1
		+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+										
NAVY	2	I		I	1	I	8	I	2	I	1 I	12
		I		I	8.3	I	66.7	I	16.7	I	8.3 I	17.6
		+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+										
AIR FORCE	3	I	1	I	5	I	11	I	6	I	1 I	24
		I	4.2	I	20.8	I	45.8	I	25.0	I	4.2 I	35.3
		+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+										
COLUMN TOTAL			1		11		35		19		2	68
			1.5		16.2		51.5		27.9		2.9	100.0
CHI-SQUARE		D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.			CELLS WITH E.F. < 5		
-----		-----	-----				-----			-----		
6.66172		8	0.5735				0.176			9 OF 15 (60.0%)		

		Q19B										
		COUNT	I	IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME				
		ROW PCT	ITTER			BETTER		SLIGHTLY	ROW			
			I	II		2I		WORSE	TOTAL			
			I			I		3I	4I			
Q1			-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+			
	1	I		I	9	I	14	I	9	I	32	
ARMY		I		I	28.1	I	43.8	I	28.1	I	47.1	
			-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+			
	2	I		I	3	I	6	I	3	I	12	
NAVY		I		I	25.0	I	50.0	I	25.0	I	17.6	
			-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+			
	3	I		2	I	3	I	9	I	10	I	24
AIR FORCE		I		8.3	I	12.5	I	37.5	I	41.7	I	35.3
			-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+			
		COLUMN		2		15		29		22		68
		TOTAL		2.9		22.1		42.6		32.4		100.0
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.				CELLS WITH E.F. < 5		
-----	-----	-----				-----				-----		
6.57284	6	0.3622				0.353				5 OF 12 (41.7%)		

		Q19C											
Q1	COUNT	I									ROW		
	ROW	IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME	SLIGHTLY		A LOT	WO	TOTAL		
	PCT	ITTER	BETTER		WORSE		RSE						
		I	II	2I	3I	4I	5I						
ARMY	1	I	4	I	5	I	8	I	12	I	3	I	32
		I	12.5	I	15.6	I	25.0	I	37.5	I	9.4	I	47.1
NAVY	2	I		I	5	I	3	I	1	I	3	I	12
		I		I	41.7	I	25.0	I	8.3	I	25.0	I	17.6
AIR FORCE	3	I	1	I	8	I	8	I	6	I	1	I	24
		I	4.2	I	33.3	I	33.3	I	25.0	I	4.2	I	35.3
COLUMN TOTAL			5		18		19		19		7		68
			7.4		26.5		27.9		27.9		10.3		100.0

CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
11.84301	8	0.1583	0.882	9 OF 15 (60.0%)

Q19D

Q1	COUNT ROW PCT	I										ROW TOTAL	
		IA LOT		BE SLIGHTLY		SAME		SLIGHTLY		A LOT NO			
		ITTER		BETTER				WORSE		RSE			
		I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II		
ARMY	1	I	1	I	1	I	13	I	11	I	6	I	32
		I	3.1	I	3.1	I	40.6	I	34.4	I	18.8	I	47.1
	2	I	2	I	2	I	1	I	5	I	2	I	12
		I	16.7	I	16.7	I	8.3	I	41.7	I	16.7	I	17.6
NAVY	3	I	1	I	2	I	10	I	11	I		I	24
		I	4.2	I	8.3	I	41.7	I	45.8	I		I	35.3
	COLUMN TOTAL		4		5		24		27		8		68
				5.9		7.4		35.3		39.7		11.8	

CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
12.99987	8	0.1119	0.706	11 OF 15 (73.3%)

Q19E

Q1	COUNT ROW PCT	I								ROW TOTAL	
		IA LOT		BE SLIGHTLY		SAME		SLIGHTLY			
		ITTER		BETTER		WORSE					
		I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II		
ARMY	1	I	1	I	19	I	6	I	6	I	32
		I	3.1	I	59.4	I	18.8	I	18.8	I	47.1
	+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+										
	2	I	2	I	7	I	3	I		I	12
I		16.7	I	58.3	I	25.0	I		I	17.6	
NAVY	3	I	4	I	11	I	6	I	3	I	24
		I	16.7	I	45.8	I	25.0	I	12.5	I	35.3
	+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+										
	COLUMN TOTAL		7		37		15		9		68
		10.3		54.4		22.1		13.2		100.0	

CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
6.15457	6	0.4061	1.235	7 OF 12 (58.3%)

Q19F

Q1	COUNT ROW PCT	I								ROW TOTAL		
		IA LOT		BE SLIGHTLY		SAME		SLIGHTLY				
		ITTER		BETTER		WORSE						
		I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II			
ARMY	1	I	4	I	20	I	4	I	4	I	32	
		I	12.5	I	62.5	I	12.5	I	12.5	I	47.1	
	2	+-----+										
		I	2	I	9	I		I	1	I	12	
NAVY	2	I	16.7	I	75.0	I		I	8.3	I	17.6	
		+-----+										
	3	I	3	I	13	I	5	I	3	I	24	
		I	12.5	I	54.2	I	20.8	I	12.5	I	35.3	
AIR FORCE	3	+-----+										
		COLUMN TOTAL		9		42		9		8		68
	TOTAL		13.2		61.8		13.2		11.8		100.0	

CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE	MIN E.F.	CELLS WITH E.F.< 5
------------	------	--------------	----------	--------------------

3.49107		6	0.7452		1.412		9 OF	12 (75.0%)				
Q19G												
COUNT		I										
ROW PCT		IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME	SLIGHTLY	A LOT	WO			
		ITTER		BETTER			WORSE	RSE	TOTAL			
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I					
Q1		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+			
	1	I	I	2	I	13	I	14	I	3	I	32
ARMY		I	I	6.3	I	40.6	I	43.8	I	9.4	I	47.1
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	2	I	I	1	I	7	I	3	I	1	I	12
NAVY		I	I	8.3	I	58.3	I	25.0	I	8.3	I	17.6
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
	3	I	1	I	5	I	11	I	7	I	I	24
AIR FORCE		I	4.2	I	20.8	I	45.8	I	29.2	I	I	35.3
		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
COLUMN		1	8	31	24	4	68					
TOTAL		1.5	11.8	45.6	35.3	5.9	100.0					
O CHI-SQUARE		D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE		MIN E.F.		CELLS WITH E.F. < 5					

8.52094		8	0.3843		0.176		10 OF		15 (66.7%)			
Q19H												
COUNT		I										
ROW	PCT	IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME	SLIGHTLY		A LOT	WO	ROW	
		ITTER			BETTER		WORSE		RSE		TOTAL	
		I		1I		2I		3I		4I	5I	
Q1		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		
	1	I		1	I	4	I	11	I	16	I	32
ARMY		I	3.1	I	12.5	I	34.4	I	50.0	I		47.1
		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		
	2	I		I		I	6	I	4	I	2	12
NAVY		I		I		I	50.0	I	33.3	I	16.7	17.6
		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		
	3	I		I		4	I	9	I	11	I	24
AIR FORCE		I		I	16.7	I	37.5	I	45.8	I		35.3
		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		-----+		
COLUMN			1		8		26		31		2	68
TOTAL			1.5		11.8		38.2		45.6		2.9	100.0
CHI-SQUARE		D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.		CELLS WITH E.F. < 5			

13.46975		8	0.0967		0.176		10 OF	15 (66.7%)	
Q19I									
COUNT		I	IA LOT BE SLIGHTLY SAME		SLIGHTLY		ROW		
ROW PCT		ITTER	BETTER		WORSE		TOTAL		
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I			
Q1		-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+	-----+			
ARMY	1	I	2 I	9 I	15 I	6 I	32		
		I	6.3 I	28.1 I	46.9 I	18.8 I	47.1		
NAVY	2	I	I	2 I	7 I	3 I	12		
		I	I	16.7 I	58.3 I	25.0 I	17.6		
AIR FORCE	3	I	3 I	3 I	14 I	4 I	24		
		I	12.5 I	12.5 I	58.3 I	16.7 I	35.3		
COLUMN			5	14	36	13	68		
TOTAL			7.4	20.6	52.9	19.1	100.0		
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE		MIN E.F.		CELLS WITH E.F. < 5			
-----	-----	-----		-----		-----			
4.25013	6	0.6429		0.882		7 OF	12 (58.3%)		

Q19J											
Q1	COUNT	I									ROW TOTAL
	ROW PCT	IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME	SLIGHTLY	A LOT	NO	ROW	
		ITTER		BETTER			WORSE	RSE	WO		
	I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I					
ARMY	1	I	4	I	14	I	9	I	5	I	32
		I	12.5	I	43.8	I	28.1	I	15.6	I	47.1
NAVY	2	I	1	I	2	I	3	I	4	I	12
		I	8.3	I	16.7	I	25.0	I	33.3	I	17.6
AIR FORCE	3	I	6	I	7	I	4	I	6	I	24
		I	25.0	I	29.2	I	16.7	I	25.0	I	35.3
COLUMN TOTAL			11		23		16		15		68
			16.2		33.8		23.5		22.1		100.0
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.			CELLS WITH E.F.< 5		
11.67397	8	0.1664				0.529			8 OF 15 (53.3%)		

		Q19K												
Q1	COUNT ROW PCT	I										ROW TOTAL		
		IA LOT		BE SLIGHTLY		SAME		SLIGHTLY		A LOT				WO
		ITTER		BETTER				WORSE		RSE				
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I	5I							
ARMY	1	I	2	I	7	I	6	I	16	I	1	I	32	
		I	6.3	I	21.9	I	18.8	I	50.0	I	3.1	I	47.1	
NAVY	2	I		I	1	I	4	I	6	I	1	I	12	
		I		I	8.3	I	33.3	I	50.0	I	8.3	I	17.6	
AIR FORCE	3	I	7	I	3	I	6	I	7	I	1	I	24	
		I	29.2	I	12.5	I	25.0	I	29.2	I	4.2	I	35.3	
COLUMN TOTAL		9		11		16		29		3		68		
		13.2		16.2		23.5		42.6		4.4		100.0		
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.				CELLS WITH E.F. < 5				
11.61465	8	0.1692				0.529				9 OF 15 (60.0%)				

		Q19L									
Q1	COUNT ROW PCT	I								ROW TOTAL	
		IA LOT		BE SLIGHTLY		SAME		SLIGHTLY			
		ITTER		BETTER				WORSE			
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I					
ARMY	1	I	6	I	18	I	5	I	3	I	32
		I	18.8	I	56.3	I	15.6	I	9.4	I	47.1
NAVY	2	I		I	2	I	6	I	4	I	12
		I		I	16.7	I	50.0	I	33.3	I	17.6
AIR FORCE	3	I	5	I	13	I	5	I	1	I	24
		I	20.8	I	54.2	I	20.8	I	4.2	I	35.3
COLUMN TOTAL		11		33		16		8		68	
		16.2		48.5		23.5		11.8		100.0	
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.			CELLS WITH E.F. < 5		
16.03007	6	0.0136				1.412			6 OF 12 (50.0%)		

Q19M									
COUNT	I								
ROW PCT	IA	LOT	BE	SLIGHTLY	SAME	SLIGHTLY	ROW		

Q1		ITTER		BETTER		WORSE		TOTAL			
		I	1I	2I	3I	4I					
ARMY	1	I	12	I	14	I	5	I	1	I	32
		I	37.5	I	43.8	I	15.6	I	3.1	I	47.1
NAVY	2	I	2	I	6	I	4	I		I	12
		I	16.7	I	50.0	I	33.3	I		I	17.6
AIR FORCE	3	I	6	I	12	I	4	I	2	I	24
		I	25.0	I	50.0	I	16.7	I	8.3	I	35.3
COLUMN TOTAL			20		32		13		3		68
			29.4		47.1		19.1		4.4		100.0
CHI-SQUARE	D.F.	SIGNIFICANCE				MIN E.F.				CELLS WITH E.F.< 5	
-----	----	-----				-----				-----	
4.70815	6	0.5818				0.529				6 OF 12 (50.0%)	

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
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